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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

to the stipulations of the order, the DNR proportionally reduced
NPPD's allocation of incidental underground water.
NPPD appealed the DNR's decision, arguing the cancellation of
0.65 cfs violated Nebraska's constitution and state law. However, the
court concluded, because NPPD failed to appeal the order, the order
became binding. Thus, NPPD's argument was a collateral attack on a
final agency decision and the court accordingly had no authority to
review whether the order violated the state constitution or state law.
NPPD also argued the DNR improperly applied the order's proportional reduction condition by interpreting the term "service" contrary
to the court's interpretation in In re Application U-2. Specifically, NPPD
claimed water from the canals that provided water for NPPD's direct
irrigation service naturally seeped into, and mixed with, groundwater,
thereby recharging Crawford's wells. NPPD thus argued that because
the water that filled Crawford's wells originated from the same source
that provided NPPD's direct irrigation water, Crawford's land remained part of NPPD's service.
The court, however, determined it did not need to interpret the
term "service," but needed to interpret the order's use of the entire
phrase "direct irrigation service." Because the DNR relied on a Nebraska statute when calculating the original grant of water rights, the
court concluded the statute's definition of "direct irrigation service"
was dispositive. The statute defined "direct irrigation service" as irrigation from the natural flow of streams, which referred only to surface
water irrigation, not underground water storage. Thus, pursuant to
the Nebraska statute, when Crawford ceased using direct irrigation
service and began using well water, such nonuse reduced NPPD's service. Based on the language of the order and the statutory definition
of "direct irrigation service," the court upheld the DNR's decision to
cancel 0.65 cfs of the NPPD's groundwater rights as a result of the reduction in NPPD's direct irrigation service.
Kathryn Garner
NEW MEXICO
Hanson v. Turney, 94 P.3d 1 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (holding the New
Mexico statute distinguished between a vested water right and a permit
to appropriate waters, a vested water right arose only after the application of waters to a beneficial use and only vested water rights could be
transferred).
Mabel Hanson ("Hanson"), the holder of two permits for the appropriation of groundwater, appealed the New Mexico State Engineer's ("State Engineer") decision denying Hanson's application that
requested a transfer of the type of the use designated in the permit
from irrigation to subdivision use. Pursuant to state law, the holder of
the water right can file an application with the State Engineer request-
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ing a transfer of either the type or place of use for all water rights under the administrative control of the State Engineer's office. The State
Engineer determined that a permit to appropriate water only constituted the first step toward securing the water right and a water right
vested only after beneficial use occurred. Hanson never placed the
allocated water to beneficial use; therefore, the State Engineer denied
the transfer application due to the lack of any transferable water right.
A State Engineer Hearing Officer agreed with the State Engineer and
upheld the denial of the transfer application. On appeal for review of
the agency decision, the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the State Engineer dismissing Hanson's action for relief. The
New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district
court.
In upholding the denial of the transfer application, the appellate
court looked at the relevant state statutes for a definition of a water
right. The statutes and legislative history provided no explicit definition of a water right; however, over a century of common-law precedent held a water right vested only after the application of the water to
beneficial use. Additionally, the court reasoned the legislature intended to differentiate between a water right and a permit to appropriate water by the statutory language that provided for the forfeiture
of both water rights and permits to appropriate where the specified
waters were not placed to a beneficial use in a reasonable time. Further, a prior decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court limited the
ability of a water right holder to transfer that right only within the limits of the amount of water the water right holder historically used. The
appellate court agreed with the State Engineer in that Hanson possessed no valid water right eligible for transfer.
Alternatively, Hanson claimed that prior inconsistent application of
the above listed rule estopped the State Engineer from now denying
the transfer application in question. Hanson presented evidence that
the State Engineer's office in the past approved applications for the
transfer of type or location of use for certain permittees while rejecting
similar applications for a lack of previous beneficial use. The appellate
court determined that the state policy strongly discouraged the application of equitable estoppel to State Engineer decisions concerning
the allocation of the state's water resources. The court further limited
estoppel claims as nonrecoverable where the correct application of
state law directly contradicted the desired relief. Finally, Hanson never
claimed a deliberate misrepresentation by the State Engineer or detrimental reliance on the part of Hanson as required for a valid estoppel
claim. The appellate court stated the prior inconsistent treatment of
transfer applications for permittees by the State Engineer could not
alone establish the pattern of shocking behavior by a state agency
needed to support an estoppel claim against the state government.
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The appellate court determined that neither a stay in discovery
granted by the district court nor the extensive delays by both the State
Engineer and the district court in ruling on the transfer application,
resulted in a due process violation, as Hanson claimed. Further, the
court noted Hanson presented no authority to demonstrate the possibility of prevailing on the merits had the court found a due process
violation.
In affirming the district court's ruling, the appellate court agreed
with the lower court's decision that permits to appropriate water were
only the first step in securing a water right and therefore not eligible
for a transfer in place or type of intended use.
Sean 1 Biddle
Herrington v. Office of the State Eng'r, 92 P.3d 31 (N.M. Ct. App.
2004) (holding application to change point of diversion for a surface
water right from an aboveground water location to well did not satisfy
two-pronged requirement pursuant to state law).
Ellis and Laverne Herrington ("Herringtons") owned a right to divert 49.73 acre feet of water per year from the Rio de Arenas. The
Herringtons' historical point of diversion was the Frazier-Bateman
Ditch ("Frazier"). In 1982, the Herringtons filed an application to
change their point of diversion to a downstream 100-foot-deep well,
arguing that upstream groundwater pumped by junior appropriators
diminished the available surface water at Frazier. Following a denial
from the Office of the State Engineer, the district court denied the
Herringtons' application as well. The Herringtons appealed to the
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
New Mexico law allows an individual with surface water rights to
change the water right's point of diversion to a well in times of shortage provided: (1) the groundwater is a source of the surface flow at the
point of surface diversion, and (2) the change in point of diversion
does not impair existing water rights. The first prong hinges on
whether the water drawn from the proposed well would, if not drawn,
reach the historical point of diversion. As a matter of logic, a downstream well, as proposed by the Herringtons, would not meet this requirement. A downstream groundwater well, by design, draws on
seepage and percolation occurring after the original surface water diversion. Thus, the seepage and percolation was not a source of the
surface water that the Herringtons had a right. Therefore, the court
affirmed the denial of the well. Because the Herringtons did not satisfy
the first prong of the test, the court did not consider the second prong.
Additionally, the Herringtons argued they had an independent
right to change their point of diversion to a groundwater well even if
they did not satisfy the aforementioned two-prong test. The Herringtons claimed the right to change the point of diversion was an incident

